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Abstract
The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are ar-
guably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Re-
cently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar,
seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy,
one much-discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we
consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two
most prominent ‘wholesale’ arguments in the literature seem irresolv-
able. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists and
anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a
dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential objections
to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two major
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arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science
freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point
about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints
at an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable real-
ism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling
of ennui afflicting contemporary philosophy of science.
A recently fashionable claim in philosophy of science is that the realism/anti-
realism debate ought to be dissolved rather than solved. There is a feeling
that the debate is not entirely well-formed, that the disputants are speaking
past one another. Motivating this view, Blackburn writes:
The issue of realism. . . is apt to prompt a particularly acute
gestalt-switch. On the one hand it seems absurd, a Berkeleian
folly, to question the reality of the objects of common-sense, of
core scientific theory. On the other hand realism is often seen as
demanding the mythical God’s eye view, whereby we step out of
our own skins, and comment on the extent to which our best sci-
entific theory corresponds with an independent reality. . . . In the
one view realism seems almost indisputably true, and in another
equally obviously false or undiscussable. So there is every open-
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ing for debates in which each side talks past each other. [Bla02,
p. 112]
He then argues that when clearly stated, a “surprising ‘quietism’ or pes-
simism about a metatheoretical position begins to seem attractive” [Bla02,
p. 111]. In explaining the success of some piece of science, there is no “getting
behind the explanation,” he writes; the best explanation for the success of
the hypothesis that the world is round is that the world is round. There is
no “further set of data about science (its success) that required something
like an independent, sideways explanation” [Bla02, p. 130]. Maddy draws a
similar conclusion, urging that we not “add extra-scientific standards of jus-
tification to our repertoire” [Mad01, pp.47–8]. Adding these extra-scientific
standards yields nothing but dead-end debates over realism. Though distinct,
Maddy and Blackburn’s positions are both descendants of Fine’s well-known
attempt to dissolve the realism debate [Fin84].
The issue may be clarified by distinguishing what we call retail arguments
for realism (arguments about specific kinds of things such as neutrinos, for
instance) from wholesale arguments (arguments about all or most of the en-
tities posited in our best scientific theories).Wholesale arguments promise a
conclusion that applies to all mature science. Wholesale realism seeks to ex-
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plain the success of science in general; wholesale anti-realism seeks to explain
the history of science in general. Dissolving the debate, we suggest, involves
attending to the retail arguments without trying to settle the debate in an
all-or-nothing, wholesale manner. Dissolvers want us to answer the question,
‘Are there atoms?’, by referring to the same evidence scientists use to support
the atomic hypothesis; e.g., Einstein and Smoluchowski’s Brownian motion
theory and the experiments by Perrin in 1908. But they do not want us to
answer by appealing to this as an instance of a more general claim, namely,
that the theory and experiment of Einstein, Smoluchowski, and Perrin are
part of a mature science and the posits of mature science are generally true.
We sympathize with potential dissolvers of the realism debate, inasmuch as
it concerns wholesale arguments. However, the exact reasons for being a dis-
solver are often unclear. Why exactly are questions like ‘What explains the
reliability and success of science?’ taboo? That it remains unsolved is not a
sufficient reason to think that a philosophical problem is illegitimate or even
insoluble. We ask and answer plenty of similar questions: ‘Is this mathemat-
ical modeling technique reliable?’ ‘What explains the success of bright silver
fishing lures?’ ‘Is the eye generally reliable?’ One is left wondering when to
solve and when to dissolve.
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Here we are concerned to provide a clear reason for believing that the
wholesale realism debate should be dissolved, a reason that does not rely
on contentious claims about the nature of truth, the status of normative
epistemology, and what-have-you.1 We hope that our analysis explains what
dissolvers find objectionable— that some debates about scientific realism
amount to adamant, futile table thumping— without the baggage of some
of their epistemological analyses. We do this by considering the two most
powerful wholesale arguments in the literature, the no-miracles argument for
scientific realism and the pessimistic induction for anti-realism. The former
has been dubbed the “ultimate argument” for realism, and anti-realists from
Duhem through Laudan have relied primarily on the latter. Worrall recently
billed these two arguments as the main considerations for and against realism
[Wor89]. They pull in opposite directions with comparable, perhaps even
balanced, force. Yet Colin Howson and Peter Lewis have independently
suggested that these arguments embody a familiar, seductive fallacy. Howson
[How00, p. 52–4] makes the point about the no-miracles argument;2 Lewis
[Lew01] about the pessimistic induction. Interestingly, neither applies the
point to both arguments. With each argument we are tricked by a base
1See Psillos [Psi99] for criticisms of Fine on these points.
2Howson’s attention was drawn to the fallacy by Korb [Kor91].
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rate fallacy. If this is correct and the intuitions marshaled by argument are
phantoms of that fallacy, then there is much sound and fury in debates over
realism that signifies nothing.
In this paper we appeal to the arguments of Howson and Lewis and use
them as part of an explanation for why the two most prominent wholesale
arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Though the formal recon-
struction of these arguments is artificial in various respects, reconstructing
the arguments this way allow us to see a crucial flaw in both. In partic-
ular, framed as Howson and Lewis would have it, we can see very clearly
why realists and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then
formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential ob-
jections to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two
major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science
freed of these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point about base
rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of
how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we
offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling of ennui afflicting contemporary
philosophy of science.
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1 The No-Miracles Argument
Some scientific theories are astonishingly successful. Classical thermodynam-
ics has made correct predictions about all manner of substance for almost two
centuries; meanwhile, quantum electrodynamics successfully predicts an elec-
trons magnetic moment to more than one part in a billion. The no-miracles
argument claims that if these theories did not latch on to the world in some
way— that is, if they were not approximately true— then this success would
be nothing short of miraculous. Some theories are too good not to be true.
The argument might be formalized in this way: For any theory x, let Sx
stand for the expression ‘x is successful’ and let Tx stand for the expression
‘x is true.’ Let ¬A be the negation of A and let Pr(A|B) be the probability
of A conditional on B. We may now gloss the argument in this way for some
current theory: [1] The theory h is very likely successful. [2] If h were true,
it would be very likely to be successful. [3] If h were false, it would not be
likely to be successful. [4] Therefore, there is a high probability that h is
true. Formalizing this version of the argument yields:
Pr(Sh)  0 (1)
Pr(Sh|Th)  0 (2)
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Pr(Sh|¬Th)  1 (3)
. .˙ Pr(Th|Sh)  0 (4)
For instance, assume the values .9, .95, and .05 for Pr(Sh), Pr(Sh|Th),
and Pr(Sh|¬Th) respectively; then, Pr(Th|Sh) = .997. The reconstruction
is crude, but it is sufficient to frame much of the action surrounding no-
miracles reasoning. One can, as Howson does, complain that it is silly to
think that there is a well-defined outcome space, probability distribution,
etc. [How00, p. 45] We sympathize but do not want to decide the matter
on a technicality. One can also, as Howson does, point out that ‘gruesome’
hypotheses short circuit the argument, for there are an infinity of these that
will make the same predictions as our successful theories. But we don’t
think most realists see the no-miracles argument as solving the problem of
induction; rightly or wrongly, that problem is being bracketed here (assumed
‘solved’ or ‘unresolvable’). The crux of the debate then becomes assessing—
often in a qualitative way— the relevant probabilities. Many anti-realists
have directed their objections at forms of (3). Larry Laudan, for instance,
notes that many past theories which were successful proved in the fullness of
time not to be true; in effect, Laudan is chipping away at (3), recommending
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a higher value for Pr(Sh|¬Th) by considering the history of science.
2 The Pessimistic Induction
Reflections on the history of science motivate the anti-realist argument. Con-
sidering past theories, we observe that many once successful theories are now
believed to be false, e.g., caloric theory. We sample the successful theories of
the past and find that many or most of them were false. We generalize and,
by induction on these cases, evaluate Pr(¬Tx|Sx) as being rather high for
an arbitrary theory x. This holds for our present successful theories; hence
we should think that they, too, will turn out to be false.3 Contemporary
discussions of this argument begin with Laudan, who writes:
I daresay that for every highly successful theory in the past of
science which we now believe to be a genuinely referring theory,
one could find half a dozen once successful theories which we now
3One referee suggests limiting the induction to fundamental theories, since all of which
but the present ones are known to be false. However, it is not clear which theories are
fundamental. Is quantum field theory fundamental? Looking at problems with renormal-
ization, many think not. Then of course there is the question of its compatibility with
general relativity. Also, which theories are considered fundamental may change with time.
Thermodynamics, devised under a caloric interpretation, might have been fundamental;
and later, under an energist interpretation like that Ostwald’s might have been fundamen-
tal again. Yet today it is clearly not fundamental. The restriction to fundamental theories
thus runs the danger of limiting the induction base to nil.
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regard as substantially non-referring.[Lau81, p. 35]
If Laudan can show that Pr(¬Th|Sh) = 6
7
, then— on the further assumption
that Pr(Sh) = 1— it follows that Pr(Th) = 1
7
. This is the pessimistic induc-
tion. It invites us to conclude that the probability of some present, successful
theory being true is rather low.4
3 The fallacy
To see the point clearly, consider a case removed from the giddy heights
of realism. Suppose that there is some disease that in the course of time
inevitably produces unique and readily identifiable symptoms. Imagine that
there is some reliable test for this disease that can identify people infected
with it who have not yet developed symptoms. Let Dx stand for ‘x has the
disease’ and let Px stand for ‘x tests positive for the disease.’ Now suppose
that if someone has the disease, then they are sure to test positive; that is,
assume Pr(Px|Dx) = 1. Suppose further that if someone is not infected there
is some small chance that they will nonetheless test positive; that is, there is
a chance that a positive test result will be a false positive. (In the language
4The argument is sometimes called a metainduction, since it generalizes over past
inductive inferences, but of course the sample includes past scientific inferences whether
inductive or otherwise.
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of significance tests, a false positive is a Type II error.) Let that chance of a
false positive be five percent, i.e. Pr(Px|¬Dx) = .05. Now suppose a patient
a tests positive for the disease. What is the probability that she actually has
it?
It is tempting to say that Pr(Da|Pa) = .95 or at least to assign a high
value to Pr(Da|Pa). We can construct the inference so as to be formally
analogous to the no-miracles argument as we formulated it above: From
Pr(Pa) = 1, Pr(Pa|Da) = 1, Pr(Pa|¬Da) = .05, infer Pr(Da|Pa)  0.
As any elementary statistics text will remind us, however, we must consider
the sample from which this patient was drawn. Suppose, among the people
tested, the disease is rare. If only 1 in 1000 people has the disease, then given
the assumptions above we should expect about 51 in 1000 to test positive.
Of those 51 who test positive, only 1 will actually have the disease. Thus,
the chance that this patient who tests positive has the disease would be 1 in
51; Pr(Da|Pa) = .02. Thinking that Pr(Da|Pa) must be rather high is the
false positives fallacy, a form of base rate neglect.5
Now return to the no-miracles argument. Setting worries about (3) aside,
there is an additional premise hidden in this formulation of the argument: h
5The argument for Pr(Da|Pa)  0 fails because the assumption Pr(Pa) = 1 is not
true given this population.
11
is, by stipulation, some current theory of a mature science. Let H be the set
of present candidate theories. Now the no-miracles argument takes this form
for all x:
Pr(Sx|x ∈ H)  0 (5)
Pr(Sx|Tx & x ∈ H)  0 (6)
Pr(Sx|¬Tx & x ∈ H)  1 (7)
. .˙ Pr(Tx|Sx & x ∈ H)  0 (8)
The argument revised in this way is still valid, but its soundness should tug
less at our intuitions. Premise (5) will hold only if any arbitrary member of
the population is likely to be successful. On the assumption that success is a
reliable indicator of truth, this is tantamount to assuming that any arbitrary
member of the population is likely to be true. If Pr(Tx|x ∈ H) is low (and
how can we know if it is not?), then (5) fails and the conclusion does not
follow.
We might attempt to assess (5) by inspecting the pool of theories, H. We
defined H as the set of candidate theories, but what theories were candidates
for our present mature sciences? It is impossible to count up or even fairly
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sample all the theories that were considered for our mature sciences, and so
it is impossible to evaluate whether (5) obtains.
The realist may insist that H is the set of theories actually professed by
our mature sciences and, thus, that we can assess (5) in a straightforward
way: sample the overt declarations of mature sciences and check their suc-
cess. Yet this would be a biased sample, since theories in mature sciences
were chosen (in no small part) because they were successful. Any theory
x ∈ H would probably be successful, just on account of its membership in H.
Thus, (6) would hold trivially and not on account of any connection between
success and truth; (7) would simply be false, since almost all x ∈ H would
be successful, whether true or not. The realist would thus avoid base rate
neglect, but at the cost of sample selection bias.
Suppose realists win the point that success-to-truth inference is reliable,
even that it is as reliable as our hypothetical diagnostic test. If true theories
are rare enough— that is, if Pr(Tx|x ∈ H) 1— then Pr(Tx|Sx) may be
very low indeed. The no-miracles argument turns on this neglecting base
rate.
The same goes for the pessimistic induction. The anti-realist hoped to
show Pr(¬Th|Sh) 0 on the basis of the historical record. Mindful of base
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rates, we should be careful to include the sample population explicitly in
formulating the argument. Let the set of past scientific hypotheses be Hp.
Suppose that historical enquiry does show that, for an arbitrary member of
Hp, Pr(¬Tx|Sx) = 17 ; that is, suppose that
Pr(¬Tx|Sx & x ∈ Hp) = 6
7
. (9)
If (9) were true, it would not have a direct bearing on the reliability of
the success-to-truth inference as expressed in Pr(Th|Sh). Past successful
theories might typically be false because most successful theories are false
(Pr(¬Tx|Sx)  0), but they might typically be false instead because most
past theories were false (Pr(Tx|x ∈ Hp) 1).6 If the latter, then the realist
may insist that the population of past theories Hp was a different kettle of
fish than the population of present theories H. On that assumption, (9) is
compatible with the realists’ desire to infer truth from the success of present
theories, expressed as (8).
Pressing the point against the realist directly would require showing that
the proportion of true to false theories is now about the same as it has always
6Of course, (9) could also be explained by some interaction of these two factors.
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been; i.e. that
Pr(Tx|x ∈ H) ≈ Pr(Tx|x ∈ Hp). (10)
The realist will contest (10), of course, and insist that the Pr(Tx|x ∈ Hi)
increases through history. The anti-realist will probably deny that we have
any way of evaluating (10), since evaluating it would presume we could de-
termine matters of truth. Lewis suggests how a new induction might address
this problem:
Given that past theories are not automatically successful, the only
way to ascertain whether the history of science supports conver-
gent realism or undermines it would be to conduct a thorough
survey of past theories, true and false, successful and unsuccess-
ful. A moment’s reflection on the difficulties of such a survey per-
haps indicates why nothing like it has been attempted. [Lew01,
p. 379]
Indeed, it is unlikely that there is any neutral way to count up past theories.
Mindful of change over time and inter-personal variation, how many theories
of Newtonian mechanics were there?
We can now offer a diagnosis of the feeling of futility in the realism de-
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bates. By pointing to apparently successful but false theories, anti-realists
responding to the no-miracles argument seek to increase Pr(¬Th|Sh). By
restricting the pool of theories under consideration to those that meet various
strict conditions like maturity, novelty, and so on, realists responding to the
pessimistic induction seek to lower the value for Pr(Sx|¬Th). (That is, they
are essentially replacing S with new, more stringent conceptions of success,
S∗.) One is working on the likelihood, the other on the probability. Cases
might shift the above probabilities/likelihoods, but it won’t matter all that
much. It won’t matter that much because to connect the likelihood with the
probability there is a third crucial ingredient, the base rates of S and T in
the population, and these aren’t talked about— for good reason.
4 A dilemma
Perhaps the most natural counter-argument is to suppose that the base rates
or priors are determined in some way. Let’s consider whether this might be
so. In the case of our imagined disease, the problem of false positives need
not undermine the usefulness of the test. If some group has been exposed
to the disease, we might have good reason to think that many of them have
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it— for instance if the disease is highly contagious and all members of the
group were exposed to it. Even without such knowledge, we might quarantine
anyone who tests positive. If only 1 in 1000 has the disease, then we should
expect quarantine to inconvenience 50 healthy people. However, this would
contain the disease, and it would certainly be better than inconveniencing
999 healthy people as we would if we quarantined potential victims without
testing. So, the test may still be a useful thing. It may also be that we have
superior but more expensive tests. We could then save money by testing
only 51 people rather than all 1000 with the expensive test. Also, we know
that infected people will ultimately eventually break out with symptoms,
giving us an independent way of checking to see if a positive result was a
false positive.
The realist will be hard-pressed to save the success-to-truth inference in
these ways. Selecting successful theories may increase the probability that we
will have a true one, just as quarantining people who test positive increases
the proportion of people under consideration who have the disease from 1 in
1000 to 1 in 51. Success of course is a good thing. Yet the true theories will
not break out with any other symptoms— they will merely continue to be
true. Nor are there further tests. This is a crucial point. The realist gambit
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is in a way posing further tests and looking for symptoms of a theory’s truth.
For example, they look for empirically successful theories that ‘break out’
with novel predictions, maturity, unification, etc. Granting realist claims,
whittling down the pool like this will increase the positive probability shift.
Settle on a definition of success, though, and we still need to know base
rates; unless we know them, these shifts are useless for helping advance the
no-miracles argument. The realist is faced with a dilemma: Either there
is a way of knowing the approximate base rate of truth among our current
theories or there is not. If there is, then we must have some independent
grounds for thinking that a theory is very likely true; yet if we had such
grounds, the no-miracles argument would be superfluous. If there is not,
then the no-miracles argument requires an assumption that some significant
proportion of our current theories are true; yet that would beg the question
against the anti-realist.
Anti-realists, meanwhile, can keep finding successful false theories. By
finding more and more of them, they can eventually drive the realist to make
a choice between giving up the reliability of the success-to-truth inference and
making the base rate of true theories very low. If Laudan found hundreds
and hundreds of successful but false theories, this ought to make the realist
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squirm a bit. Even so, as reflection on the above numbers shows, realists
can always find a value of the base rate that suits their purposes. More
importantly, given the tremendous controversy over merely a handful of cases
(aether, phlogiston, the wave theory of light, caloric, etc.), it is unlikely that
a sufficient number of uncontroversial successful-but-false theories would ever
be found to even slightly nudge a realist cognizant of the base rate fallacy.
Of course, if the base rates are interpreted as prior probabilities in a sub-
jective Bayesian framework, the problem can be avoided. If some interval of
values can be deemed the subjectively ‘reasonable’ priors, then— as Dorling
shows [Dor92]— the Bayesian can be a realist or an anti-realist. Given certain
priors and evidence, Bayesians will be committed to realism about particular
entities; given other priors, Bayesians will be committed to anti-realism. But
notice that these are retail arguments about particular entities. In Dorling’s
cases, there may well be some plausible set of priors available, priors that
realists and anti-realists could have agreed on before all the evidence came
in. In the present wholesale case, however, where the entire fate of realism
or anti-realism seems bound up with the priors, we can’t imagine how one
could find a reasonable set of priors.
Nor can we imagine how one could find the objective ratio of true theories
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among all past theories. We might admit that in principle there is such a
ratio, but there is in practice no way to ascertain it. And if there were, there
would then be no need to make either argument in the first place.
5 Doing justice to intuitions
The fallaciousness of the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction
may come as no surprise. Worrall suggests that they might better be called
“considerations” for and against realism. Although not valid arguments,
they reveal a deep realist intuition and a deep anti-realist intuition [Wor89,
p. 101].7 What do the considerations amount to? Well, any story about
science and its history had better allow for the fact that sometimes scientists
have thought highly of theories that later turned out false; and any story
about science had better reflect the fact that science sometimes makes very
detailed predictions that are confirmed with beautiful precision.
Yet one may feel an urge to say more than this. Even after the exposure
of the fallacy, the two ‘arguments’ may still prime us to feel realist or anti-
realist impulses. Whether we should acknowledge these impulses as probative
7In response to the tension between these two, he suggests structural realism as a
position that might sit well with both.
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intuitions is another matter.
One may object: ‘There must be something wrong with the foregoing
discussion! Debates that so many smart people have taken seriously can’t be
predicated on such an elementary fallacy.’ Yet there is evidence that people
are prone to commit the false positives fallacy. Psychologists have been aware
of the phenomenon at least since Meehl and Rosen’s classic paper of 1955
[MR55], and it has been demonstrated experimentally by Kahneman and
Tversky and others following after them (see [TK82]). It is not confined to
the psychologist’s subject of choice, the college undergraduate; Casscells, et
al. demonstrate its prevalence among physicians [CSG78]. There is no reason
to expect that philosophers would be immune.
The propensity to commit this fallacy explains why these two ‘consid-
erations’ have rhetorical force even after their logical force has been shown
lacking. Just as we are susceptible to optical illusions after we understand
them for what they are, we may continue to be susceptible to these logical
illusions. We should not try to do justice to the intuitions, except in the
sense that the court may do justice to a killer. This diagnosis, if it is correct,
means that the major considerations for and against realism come to naught.
We have argued so far that the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic
21
induction are instances of the same fallacy, that research suggests that ed-
ucated people are apt to commit this fallacy, and thus that the intuitive
appeal of the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction should not
be taken as a sign that they have any probative force. This does not en-
tail that there is no issue between realism and anti-realism. Nevertheless,
one wonders what debates about realism would be like without appeals to
either of these attractive but fallacious arguments. We return to this train of
thought in section 7.
6 Reformulations
Following Howson and Lewis, we’ve formulated both arguments as statistical
inferences of a particular kind. Perhaps the point is merely an artifact of a
deficient formulation of the argument?
The no-miracles argument might be reconstructed as a likelihood infer-
ence (cf. Sober [Sob90]). As we’ve already noted, this could provide some
incremental confirmation of a theory’s truth. That is, learning that a theory
is successful gives us a reason to revise upwards the probability that it is
true. Nevertheless, nothing guarantees that the resulting probability will be
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high enough to merit belief. Recall the hypothetical disease: The probability
that an arbitrary person has the disease is .001; testing positive shifts this
upward to .02. Yet the realist seems to think that the probability of the truth
of theories is close to 1 or at least that it’s greater than .5. An argument
purely in terms of likelihoods cannot secure this conclusion.
The realist might object that the no-miracles argument is not fallacious
when supplemented with an appropriate auxiliary assumption. As argued
above, however, suitable assumptions (e.g., that there is a significant propor-
tion of true theories in H) either beg the question or render the no-miracles
argument redundant. The realist is still free to suggest that the supplemented
no-miracles argument is valid and that he the realist thinks it is sound. It
then joins inductive defenses of induction and abductive defenses of inference
to the best explanation. Here we enter murky waters and cannot do justice
to the subtleties of the discussion in the literature. [How00, ch. 10] [Lip94]
[Psi99]
It might be better to reconstruct the argument such that the chances
and miracles are not expressed as probabilities.8 It is common to say that
the no-miracles argument is not a probabilistic argument at all, but instead
8As Howson points out (and we agree), it is doubtful that there are really well-defined
sample spaces and probability distributions over the space of all theories anyway.
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an inference to the best explanation (IBE). Critics of IBE complain that
the argument is viciously circular— anti-realists doubt that IBE is in fact a
reliable inferential method, so it can’t be used to defend realism. Defenders
of the argument respond that there is ‘good’ circular and ‘bad’ circular, that
if the argument is only as bad as deductive defenses of deductions it is not
so bad. The upshot of these debates seems to be that defenders of IBE view
the IBE no-miracles argument as having the rhetorical force to make the
hearer believe what the hearer believes. Perhaps, as Lipton [Lip94] argues,
these ‘sermons to the choir’ have a legitimate purpose, but they cannot settle
debates over realism.9 As such, we do not see how the no-miracles argument
can be meaningfully saved by another formulation.
What about the pessimistic induction? One might defend it as a classical
statistical inference: If the theories are drawn at random from the history
of science, then we may infer from the theories sampled to the population
of all scientific theories. The question, of course, is whether it’s appropriate
to think of scientific theories as balls in an urn. For a classical statisti-
cal inference, the draws from the urn must be independent and identically-
9Psillos [Psi99] defends a version of the no-miracles argument that presumes realism
and then aims to show that IBE is reliable. We have no immediate quarrel with such
an approach, since it grants what we hope to demonstrate— viz. that the no-miracles
argument fails as a probative argument for realism.
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distributed. Cases offered for the pessimistic induction are not drawn in this
way, since they all come from the past. This is analogous to pouring half of
the balls from the original urn into a second urn and taking random draws
only from this second urn. It will only be legitimate to generalize from the
second urn to the original urn if the distribution of balls in the second urn
is the same as the distribution in the original. The analogous assumption in
the historical case is that the distribution of true theories in the past is the
same is the distribution of true theories in the present and future— that is, it
is just the contested assumption about base rates. So we don’t see how even
a completely random sampling of past theories could resolve the problem.
We can imagine IBE formulations of the pessimistic induction: the ab-
sence of any robust connection between success and truth might be offered
as the best explanation for the eventual failure of past successful theories.
This is a tantalizing suggestion. We leave it undeveloped, since we doubt
that any anti-realists would be charmed by such a schizophrenic defense of
anti-realism in the first place.
Perhaps there is some formulation of one or the other argument that
escapes these worries. We note simply that the obvious formulations do
not. Consider, then, a realist who finds realism appealing because of a pre-
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theoretic intuition that the success of science could not be a miracle. Is
it plausible to think that her intuition harkens to some elusive formulation
of the argument? Isn’t it more plausible to think that she has the obvious
version of the argument in mind, especially since the fallacy in the obvious
version is one that even educated people are prone to commit? The same
holds for an anti-realist who finds anti-realism appealing on account of the
history of science. Since he has a psychological propensity to neglect base
rates in a way that would make the obvious version of the argument convinc-
ing for him, then why think his intuitions anticipate some as-yet-undiscovered
argument?
7 Imagining a future
Imagine, if you will, what the literature on scientific realism would be like
if we set aside no-miracles arguments and pessimistic inductions. As we
mentioned at the outset, the no-miracles arguments and pessimistic induction
are wholesale arguments, in that the conclusions are supposed to hold for
all (or most) of the theories of our present, mature sciences. If we eschew
these two arguments, we might look for some other wholesale motivation to
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settle realism debates en masse or instead for retail arguments that resolve
questions only about particular kinds or individuals.
7.1 Other wholesale arguments
The underdetermination of theory by evidence, as it is often construed, is
a wholesale argument for anti-realism about unobservable entities. Every
theory had empirically equivalent rivals, we are told, and there is no epistemic
distinction to be made between empirically equivalent theories. This is not
a statistical argument, since we are promised that not just most but all
theories have empirically equivalent rivals. Thus, there is no population
under consideration and there are no base rates to neglect.
Yet, anyone hoping to exploit underdetermination in this way faces a
dilemma. First horn: The underdetermination should not be too sweeping.
Since the anti-realist has no better answer to the problem of induction than
the realist has got, underdetermination threatens to sweep away predictions
about observables just as it sweeps away claims about unobservables. That
way lies scepticism. Second horn: The underdeterminaton must be sweeping
enough that the details of particular cases will not obviate it. In contem-
porary quantum physics, for instance, there are several theories which are
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(plausibly) underdetermined with respect to one another. Nevertheless, as
Cordero argues, the common ground between these several theories “does
manage to tell us a great deal about what actually exists and what it is like”
[Cor01, p. S310]. Some modest realism would be justified in this case, so pu-
tatively wholesale underdetermination would give way to retail evaluation of
particular scientific episodes. The dilemma for wholesale underdetermination
arguments, then, is how to find underdetermination strong enough to apply
without reference to particulars but not so strong as to yield scepticism.
The conjunction argument is another wholesale consideration that does
not rely on neglecting base rates. When chemists tell us that an object is
‘negatively charged,’ we expect that object to act according to electro-static
laws governing things that are ‘negatively charged.’ If we were to consider
only the empirical parts of each model, such prediction would be illegitimate.
We thus derive a predication from the chemical and physical theories taken
together, considering not only unobservable parts of the theories but also
assuming that a shared phrase (‘negatively charged’) has the same meaning
in each theory.10
Yet, it’s not always appropriate to apply the conjunction of our best
10[Boy82] There are objections to the conjunction argument, of course, [van80] but it
interests us here merely as a putatively wholesale argument.
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scientific theories. This is most obvious when our best accounts in different
domains are logically inconsistent; for instance, the spacetime metric being
dynamical in general relativity and non-dynamical in quantum theory (see
[CH01]). Some conjunctions are appropriate and others aren’t. Attending to
when conjunction is good practice and when it is not demands attending to
the details of specific cases. It may deliver realism about some entities, but
it would mean abandoning hopes for a wholesale answer to the question of
scientific realism.11
There may yet be other wholesale arguments waiting in the wings, and
our arguments against underdetermination and conjunction qua wholesale
arguments have been necessarily brief. Regardless, its worth imagining what
sort of realism or anti-realism would survive if it were secured without the
no-miracles argument or pessimistic induction. Without these, we lose the
rationale for both entity realism and structural realism, two accounts that
struggle to sharply divide theoretical structures from entities posited by the
theory.
11In recent work, Philip Kitcher deploys an argument form he calls the Galilean Strategy
to underwrite realism [Kit01a] [Kit01b, ch. 2]. As P.D. Magnus has argued, however, the
Galilean Strategy leads to realism about some particular kinds but fails to underwrite the
inference from success to truth [Mag03]; as we now put the point, the Galilean Strategy
succeeds as a retail argument form but fails as a wholesale argument for realism.
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7.2 Retail arguments
Nothing said here dooms retail arguments for or against realism. There
may be good reasons to be a realist about neutrinos, an anti-realist about
top quarks, and so on. Indeed, it would have been a surprise if base rates
were neglected in all the arguments marshaled for and against the reality of
particular entities or structures. Return to the case of our imagined disease,
and ask if we should be realists about the disease even when it is incubating
but yet to show symptoms. As noted above, we may sometimes know the
base rate of the disease in a population by independent means. Moreover, we
might be able to identify the disease-causing pathogen under a microscope.
This would provide an argument for realism that is not statistical and, hence,
does not implicate base rates in any obvious way.
We therefore have at least one clear way of distinguishing profitable real-
ism debates from unprofitable ones. Profitable ones will either not be sweep-
ing statistical arguments or, if they are statistical arguments, will be such
that the base rates can be determined through independent means. Consider
some classic examples. The debate over the reality of atoms at the turn of
the twentieth century was one of huge significance in science. This was not a
general statistical argument. No one used (say) ‘most atomistic theories turn
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out to be true’ as an argument for atomism. With argument and experiment
it was thus possible for the most forceful opponent of atomism, Planck, to
change his mind and be committed to atomism. With the debate among
caloric theory, the wave theory of heat, and the dynamical theory it was the
same. The arguments were non-statistical. Here again it was possible for a
notable defender of caloric, Thompson, to completely change his mind due
to theoretical and experimental arguments.12
Of course, there are also statistical arguments made in realism debates,
especially in debates in high energy particle physics. Base rates may well be
used. In any retail case, however, there will in general be independent handles
on determining these base rates. Consider for instance the discovery of the
W± particle, the charged intermediate vector boson needed by the Weinberg-
Salam theory of electroweak interactions. Observed events matched what was
predicted by theory: the mass, type of momentum, and lack of particle jets.
But how do we know that these events were not background effects pretend-
ing to look like these candidate effects? It is possible that this happened, and
one might worry that if the base rate of such mimicking events is high then
12Within some theories of confirmation (e.g. Bayesianism), a retail inference from con-
firming evidence to theory is treated in terms of probabilities— and so problems of base
rates might arise. Wholesale arguments need to address populations of theories, however,
so they invite statistical considerations— and so problems with base rates do arise.
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we cant state with confidence that we have likely found the W± particle.
The key here is to understand that there are independent theories of many
other particles, collisions, etc., each of these independently tested, that in
fact provide independent predictions of the probabilities of such background
effects (see [Fra86]). Here is a case where we do need to know various base
rates to corroborate our theory, but these base rates are obtainable. In gen-
eral, science proceeds with a variety of methods at independently estimating
crucial base rates, e.g., using a variety of instruments, experimental checks
and calibration, eliminating alternative explanations, etc.
One may object that these independent theories themselves require base
rates, the theories corroborating these base rates require base rates, and
so on. In other words, maybe there is no way of breaking out of the circle
involving base rates. We see no particular reason to believe that this is the
case. If it is and the circle is wide enough, however, then this claim begins to
sound like merely a restatement of the problem of general skepticism— not
something we are concerned to tackle here.
One may also object:13 ‘Retail arguments rely on general assumptions
that can be used to construct a wholesale argument. You agree that in the
13We owe this interesting objection to an anonymous referee.
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early 20th century it was appropriate to believe in the existence of atoms
for all the usual reasons. Let F be whatever features of the situation at
the time made it reasonable to believe in atoms. There is then a wholesale
argument that, whenever F obtains, one should believe in (say) the principle
theoretical posits and entities of the relevant science.’
We believe this objection would have us reprise a standard debate in
epistemology, namely, the problem of the criterion [Chi03]. How do we know
which beliefs are justified? Do we have a criterion, like Descartes’ clarity
and distinctness, and then see which particular beliefs satisfy this criterion?
Or do we begin with particular beliefs we know to be justified, like Moore,
and then generalize from them? Retail arguments turn on particularism in
the present context. We acknowledge that it may be possible to get a kind
of wholesale argument by discovering something in common among all good
retail arguments for realism. Without trying to settle the larger epistemo-
logical issue, we offer a note of caution. Reflecting on the vast complexities
of various historical episodes in science, there is no reason to think that the
general assumptions one finds will be at all simple, natural, or even non-
disjunctive; in short, there is no guarantee that the criterion one finds will
be either interesting or useful. So although it is logically possible to turn a
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retail argument into a kind of wholesale argument, the resulting wholesale
argument may appeal to ‘general assumptions’ that are long, gruesome, and
can do none of the heavy lifting that wholesale arguments are usually meant
to do.
Perhaps philosophers inclined to dissolve debates over realism will be
no happier with retail arguments than they were with wholesale arguments.
Fine, for instance, rejects what he calls piecemeal realism. He decries realists’
attempts “to relocate the school to where conditions seem optimal for its
defense, and then to insinuate that the case for such a ‘piecemeal realism’
could be made elsewhere too, were there but world enough and time” [Fin91,
p. 79]. Fine describes a plausible stratagem for a realist who sees the value
of retail arguments but has a hidden yen for wholesale conclusions. Yet
licensing the move from a collection of realist cases to conclusions about all
or most of science requires an implicit statistical argument that the cases are
representative.Such statistical arguments are doomed.
What Fine calls piecemeal realism is thus only an ersatz retail argument;
the particular case is offered as a proxy for all of science. As Fine sees it, the
piecemeal strategy is motivated by the opposition between the no-miracles
argument and the pessimistic induction [Fin91, p. 81–84]. We have argued
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that these opposing wholesale arguments should be set aside. We should
pay attention to particular cases for their own sake and not as proxies for
something else.14
8 Conclusion
We can now answer the question with which we began. The question of why
scientific methods succeed is, in a sense, just as legitimate as the question of
why silver fishing lures succeed in catching fish. There is nothing wrong with
the philosopher wanting an answer to the broader question. Because one can
imagine a full continuum of cases where base rates are knowable to a varying
degree, one can see that the distinction between wholesale and retail is a
matter of degree and not kind. We concede that there is no sharp distinction
between the wholesale and the retail. Nevertheless, good retail arguments for
realism are on one side of the spectrum and wholesale arguments occupy an
extreme position on the other side. The lunge for totality in wholesale argu-
ments suggests that they will need statistical considerations about all or most
theories and also that there will not be any independent methods for esti-
14As a matter of terminology, there is some small reason to prefer ‘retail’ to ‘piecemeal’.
Retail arguments naturally contrast with wholesale arguments, but piecemeal realism has
no such natural contrast. (Whole hog realism?)
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mating the relevant base rate. Without independent methods for estimating
crucial base rates, there is little to do but make arguments that beg the ques-
tion. Wholesale realism debates persist not due to mere stubbornness, but
because there is no reason for opponents to agree. The more modest reach of
the narrower retail question allows for arguments that are non-statistical or
for broad agreement in estimating base rates. These debates are profitable
because there is reason to agree.
We suggest that the great hope for realism and anti-realism lies in re-
tail arguments that attend to the details of particular cases. It is unlikely
that either side will win every argument; it seems more likely that realism
and anti-realism are options to be exercised sometimes here and sometimes
there.15 This equivocal victory for each might be uncomfortable for realists
and anti-realists alike, but so be it.
15Kukla suggests that science which is sometimes realist, sometimes anti-realist would
be irrational [Kuk98, p. 28], but we do not see why this should be the case. Tailoring
one’s opinions to the particular evidence at hand seems to us instead the paradigm of
rationality.
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